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ANIMAL ‘CULTURE WARS’; EVIDENCE FROM THE WILD? 
 
Rachel L Kendal 
Dept. of Psychology 
University of St Andrews 
 
 
The notion of animal culture has gathered momentum over the last 50 years, fuelled 
by the findings of long-term field studies of primates and cetaceans (see Perry et al. 
2003; Rendell & Whitehead 2001; van Schaik et al. 2003; Whiten et al. 1999 
http://culture.st-and.ac.uk:16080/chimp/).    Researchers have observed such diverse 
behaviours as chimpanzees fishing for ants, orangutans blowing raspberries before 
bedtime, capuchin monkeys playing bizarre ritualised games, dolphins wearing 
sponges on their noses whilst foraging and humpback whales singing distinctive 
songs.  In a mosaic pattern, evocative of human cultural variation, animal populations 
vary in either the way they perform the behaviour or whether they perform it at all, 
purportedly due to differences in the spread of learned information between 
individuals (or social learning). 
 
Interesting stuff you may be thinking, but why, as a psychologist, should I be 
interested?   Well, such social learning allows naïve individuals, whether human or 
non-human, access to adaptive behaviour invented by more knowledgeable 
individuals.  Individual behaviour is governed then by the tradeoffs made between 
knowledge obtained by oneself, in the process paying costs of time, energy and risk 
such as encountering toxic foods, and knowledge obtained from others, which, 
although potentially less reliable, is often easier and safer to obtain (Kendal et al. 
2005). Indeed, there is a vigorous debate amongst psychologists as to whether social 
and asocial (or individual) learning are reliant on the same underlying cognitive 
processes and whether evidence for some forms of social learning may be indicative 
of complex psychological capabilities, such as theory of mind.  As social learning can 
influence survival (e.g. through enhancing foraging) and reproduction (e.g. 
preferences for exaggerated traits in mates) it also has evolutionary implications.  
Indeed, it may well have been key in promoting the evolution of intelligence in 
animals, including humans (Whiten & van Schaik 2007).  Conversely, it is also 
responsible for the spread of maladaptive behaviours, such as smoking.  On a more 
applied note, social learning has implications for both human and animal welfare and 
conservation, for example in enhancing the dissemination of health advice in humans 
and the efficacy of life-skills training for animals to be reintroduced to the wild. 
 
In this article I shall highlight the problem of identifying the all-important process of 
social learning in data from natural animal populations, questioning whether 
unequivocal evidence for social learning is sufficient to claim ‘culture’ in animals.  
The question of whether non-human animals exhibit culture, and the importance of 
this for understanding human behaviour, depends fundamentally on definitions of 
culture.  Definitions range from those that deem a species cultural if it merely exhibits 
traditions transmitted via social learning, to those requiring that transmission involve 
teaching or imitation or generate group-specific norms and ethnic markers. 
 
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL LEARNING IN THE WILD 
Although field work is time consuming and difficult without it we cannot hope to 
understand the selection pressures that promote the evolution of ‘culture’.  However, 
evidence from the wild is often indirect and by the standards used to judge laboratory 
experiments, lacking rigour.  The predominant ethnographic method pioneered by 
Whiten (Whiten et al. 1999) involves comparing variation in behavioural traits at 
multiple sites.  Such variation is deemed cultural if there is no reason to believe it 
stems from inter-site genetic or ecological differences.  A second approach, involving 
multi-factorial analyses, provides a quantitative means of evaluating the influence of 
ecological, genetic and social associations (a proxy measure of social learning) upon 
behavioural similarity amongst individuals (Whitehead, in Press; Seargent & Mann, in 
Press).  As such techniques do not directly assess whether social learning is required 
to produce the observed pattern of behavioural variation they leave us open to both 
over- and under-estimating its role (see review Laland et al., in Press).  Hence, 
whether behavioural variation in the wild is deemed cultural is largely down to 
subjective opinion, and heated debates have ensued which some  have gone so far as 
to describe as ‘war’ (McGrew 2002). 
 
Consider one oft-debated example.  Chimpanzee ant-dipping is frequently described 
as one of the strongest cases for culture in the wild (Whiten et al. 1999).  At Gombe in 
Tanzania, a long wand is inserted into nests, withdrawn as the ants swarm up it, and 
then run through the hand forming the ants into a ball that is then placed in the mouth.  
In contrast, in the Tai forest of the Ivory Coast a short stick is used which is then 
pulled directly through the mouth.  The question arises as to why the Tai chimps use 
this seemingly less efficient technique when sticks of varying lengths are available at 
both sites.   Is the difference purely cultural?  Researchers studying at a third site, 
Bossou, discovered that the technique used was correlated with the species of ant 
being captured (Humle & Matsuzawa 2002).  They discovered, through using 
themselves as guinea pigs, that black ants swarm up sticks more aggressively and give 
more painful bites than red ants.  Not surprisingly then, chimpanzees at Bossou use 
long sticks for black ants and short ones for red ants.  Although these findings do not 
indicate whether dipping techniques reflect differing ant prey at Tai and Gombe they 
indicate caution when inferring a cultural explanation. A recent study, comparing ant 
dipping at 13 African sites, reposts this argument indicating variation in techniques 
cannot be explained by the ant taxa present (Schoening et al. in review).  For Byrne 
(2006) the hallmark of culture is intricate complexity of behaviour.  Thus, whether or 
not ant-dipping varies according to prey ferocity is beside the point as the skill itself is 
intricate and unlikely to be learnt in its entirety by a solitary chimpanzee, implying a 
role for social learning.   
 
The hard evidence that putative traditions are socially learned is not yet there, largely 
because there are no methods for generating such evidence in the wild.  Studies of 
captive chimpanzees have shown they can sustain foraging traditions, across pseudo-
generations, through high-fidelity social learning (Whiten, in Press).  Although these 
findings add credence to the supposition that social learning is behind inter-site 
variation in behaviour, it does not tell us whether social learning can be implicated in 
natural behavioural variation.  Other researchers have gone some way to identifying 
social learning more directly in the wild using proxy measures, such as patterns of 
affiliation and observation.  Both in capuchins and chimpanzees there is evidence that 
individuals selectively watch others from whom they can learn skills they have yet to 
master (Biro et al. 2003; Perry et al. 2003).  Indeed the chimpanzee evidence stems 
from a particularly imaginative field experiment of the type I would like to encourage.  
Biro and colleagues took advantage of a natural forest clearing, through which 
chimpanzees travelled daily, in order to introduce them to novel nuts and observe the 
spread of any nut-cracking behaviour through the group. 
 Until we have tools that can provide widely acceptable evidence for social learning, in 
any species, controversy over the extent of culture in animals will reign. The problem 
with field evidence to date is its inability to quantify the likelihood that the 
behavioural traits in question could be learnt without recourse to social learning.      In 
an attempt to ameliorate this situation, my colleagues and I are currently working on 
methods which attempt to assess the likelihood that social learning is required to 
achieve the pattern of  behaviour observed and also to identify potential  signatures of 
social learning (Laland et al. in Press).  One method we are developing is the ‘option 
bias method.’  It rests on the assumption that, within a group, social learning will 
generate a greater than expected homogeneity in the behavioural options used to solve 
a task (e.g. use of a short or long twig).  We test whether a group’s bias towards one 
option can be taken as evidence of social learning by comparing it to a probability 
distribution of the bias that would arise under individual learning.  As collecting this 
data in the wild is usually impossible we compute these probabilities through 
simulating what is essentially an individual learning, or control, condition.  If the 
observed bias exceeds 95% of those expected were individuals to learn individually 
(e.g. there could be a bias for one option as it is easier or more salient) then social 
learning can be inferred.   
 
DOES SOCIAL LEARNING EQUATE TO CULTURE? 
For many, confidence in the role of social learning in behavioural variation is 
sufficient for the animals in question to be said to have culture.  For instance Laland 
and Janik (2006) state that culture represents, ‘group-typical behavioural patterns, 
shared by community members that rely upon socially learned and transmitted 
information’.  Here, the more complex culture of humans is believed to be an 
elaboration of similar behavioural processes in animals and an understanding of these 
can give insight into human culture. 
 
Some researchers falling within this camp may actually claim the best evidence for 
culture is in fish or rats!  This is not to say that they have a monopoly on culture, 
merely that such species are more amenable than primates or cetaceans to the 
manipulations required to demonstrate social learning.  For example, Warner (1988) 
showed that mating sites are socially learned in wrasse. He did this by exchanging 
fish, noting that immigrants adopted the traditional mating sites of residents.  
Similarly, pine-cone seed eating by rats in Israel, enabling their survival in pine 
forests (Terkel 1996), is arguably the strongest example of social learning in the wild.  
Terkel and colleagues showed that rats born to pine-cone stripping mothers but 
fostered by non pine-cone stripping dams did not learn to access pine-seeds whereas 
those born to non pine-cone strippers and fostered by pine-cone strippers did.  Further 
experiments showed that pups merely needed the ‘tip-off’ of exposure to partially 
stripped cones to learn the behaviour.   
 
Even if the case for animal culture is accepted, it is obvious that the consequences of 
human culture are further reaching than that of non-humans.  Human culture has 
enabled us to drastically alter the environment in which we live and even walk on the 
moon; niche construction on an unprecedented scale (Odling-Smee et al. 2003).  The 
remaining researchers focus upon what it might be that sets human culture apart from 
that of animals. 
 
DOES TEACHING AND IMITATION EQUATE TO CULTURE? 
Many resist the idea of animal culture, preferring to speak of animal traditions (Galef, 
in Press; Tomasello, in Press).  They insist on specific forms of social transmission, 
such as imitation or teaching due to their purported necessity for the emergence of 
cumulative culture.  This gradual accumulation of socially learned variants, by 
allowing individuals to profit from the discoveries of previous generations, has 
enabled humans to achieve things not possible for one person to invent from scratch.  
Here, unless behavioural actions are taught or exactly imitated (rather than observers 
finding their own methods to achieve the same ends) there is insufficient fidelity of 
information transmission for the progressive modification of behaviour.  In their view 
animal culture is analogous to human culture as teaching and imitation play, at best, a 
limited role in animals yet are defining features of human culture.   
 
An additional criterion often stipulated is that of a repertoire of behavioural 
traditions.  After all, human cultures are distinguished by the suite of traditions that 
make them unique, for example, people who eat roast beef on a Sunday are likely to 
speak english. It has been claimed, however, that chimpanzee, orangutan and 
capuchin communities display unique sets of traditions relating to activities such as 
foraging, grooming and retiring for the night (Whiten & van Schaik 2007).  Similarly, 
sperm whale clans co-existing in the same habitat, have unique vocal repertoires that 
covary with distinctive movement strategies (Rendell & Whitehead 2003).   
 
A case study may clarify the distinction between culture and tradition.  Lonsdorf and 
colleagues (2004) discovered that chimpanzees spending more time observing their 
mothers fishing for termites acquired skills earlier.  However, only females showed 
evidence that they had learnt how to fish for termites socially, as the depth to which 
their tools were inserted correspond to the depths used by their mothers.  Here, we 
have evidence of the involvement of social learning in the development of a 
behaviour, yet some would claim termite fishing has little to do with ‘culture’.  We 
see that social learning in the form of local enhancement (attraction to termite 
mounds) or emulation (a desire to obtain termites) is functional for chimpanzees and 
that females learn something of the form of the behaviour (aka imitation) too.  
However, as males seemingly learn how to termite fish independently of their mothers 
it appears that ‘imitation’ is not necessary for the behaviour’s transmission.  
Researchers of this camp would therefore refute the claim that this was a cultural 
behaviour, preferring to call it a tradition.  Quite a fine line to walk especially with 
data from the wild. 
 
In fact it is far from clear that humans are the only species capable of imitation, or that 
imitation is required for durability of transmission.  Laboratory experiments have 
highlighted imitative abilities in birds, monkeys, apes and rodents (Zentall 2006).  
The milk bottle-top opening tradition of British birds has been maintained since the 
1930’s and requires nothing more than exposure of birds to previously pierced tops 
(Sherry & Galef 1990).  Similarly, there are an ever increasing number of reports of 
teaching in wild animals, including chimpanzees (Boesch, 1991) and meerkats 
(Thornton & McAuliffe 2006).  
 
Cumulative Culture? There is currently little evidence, in animals, for the gradual 
accumulation of beneficial modifications to a behaviour.  Boesch (2003) claims that 
nut-cracking has increased in complexity and efficiency from banging nuts against 
trees, to using a stone hammer, to additionally using a stone anvil on which the nut is 
placed and finally use of a stone to stabilise the anvil.  Similarly, the fashioning of 
tools from leaves, by New Caledonian Crows hunting for invertebrates, appears to 
have increased in complexity from simple step shaped tools, to those with a thick 
handle and tapering tip; modifications increasing caterpillar catching efficiency (Hunt 
& Gray 2003).  However, both examples merely note diversity of behaviour, 
consistent with cumulative evolution, rather than actually monitoring the 
accumulation of modifications through social learning.  As yet, we don’t know what 
cognitive processes underlie a capacity for cumulative culture.  If, for example, it 
involves theory of mind then we must enter the debate as to which animals appear to 
possess a theory of mind akin to humans.  Despite this it appears that use of imitation 
and teaching to distinguish animal ‘tradition’ and human ‘culture’, is open to 
question.  The search continues… 
 
DO NORMS AND ETHNIC MARKERS EQUATE TO CULTURE? 
E.B. Tyler, the founder of cultural anthropology, proposed that culture includes the 
regulation of individual behaviour (law) and the development of symbolic 
reinforcement apparatus for that regulation (religion and morals). Here, seemingly 
arbitrary, non-functional traits, acquire moral significance such that a group is defined 
by the trait and between-group competition is based upon differences in this symbolic 
ethnic marker.  Take, for example, the adoption of uniforms by football supporters 
and the abuse some suffer based upon their uniform. 
 
So, in humans one ‘culture’ does not simply view another culture’s behaviour as 
different to theirs but often, in some sense, wrong.  There is currently little evidence, 
and it is hard to see how we could acquire such evidence, that for example, capuchins 
attempting to remove fruit from a husk by pounding it, are morally outraged at the 
sight of others scrubbing their fruit such that they punish these deviant ‘scrubbers’!  
Indeed evidence for the processes, such as cooperation and strong reciprocity, 
underlying such morality and third-party punishment (that is punishment of norm-
violators even when norm-adoption would not directly benefit you or your kin) is 
sparse even in captive primates (see Hill, in Press).  
 
An ability to learn the significance of arbitrary actions is often heralded as 
fundamental to human culture and appears to be among the strongest arguments for 
distinguishing animal and human culture.  Consider two candidate traits in animals.  
Researchers have documented the, apparently non-functional, hand-clasp of wild 
chimpanzees during grooming (Whiten et al. 1999).  However, the spontaneous 
spread of this behaviour in a captive group indicated the behaviour symbolises a close 
relationship between the groomers rather than being a candidate for a symbol of group 
identity (Bonnie & de Waal 2006).  A similar story unfolded with wild capuchins 
where researchers have documented many bizarre rituals including insertion of fingers 
into each other’s nostrils and other ritualised games (Perry et al. 2003).  Although 
initially Perry thought these rituals may signal group identity, evidence is not 
consistent with this.  The games are inconspicuous and are not exhibited to a greater 
extent when encountering non-group members.   
 
CONCLUSION 
One point of consensus is the necessity, if not sufficiency, of social learning in 
underpinning culture. The development of new methods, such as those outlined at the 
beginning of this article, and their use in conjunction with existing methods, could in 
the future enhance peace in the culture 'wars'.  Once we have resolved whether the 
traits in question are transmitted via social learning then we can profitably enter into 
the debate as to whether animals have culture.  We can but hope that the semantics of 
the issue do not obscure scientific progress and intercourse between disciplines.  
Despite the controversy, the field has important implications for our understanding of 
the continuity of the animal and human mind and how we characterise humans’ place 
in nature.  
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